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Abstract 
Research suggests that individuals who believe their intelligence has the 
capacity to incrementally grow may make less accurate judgements of learning 
(JOLs) than those who believe intelligence is a fixed entity. JOLs represent a 
prediction of future recall, and have implications for real world study behaviour. The 
present study aimed to determine whether delaying JOLs could improve JOL 
accuracy for incremental theorists. It was hypothesised that there would be an 
interaction effect of theory of intelligence (TOI) and time on metacognitive 
accuracy, and that overall metacognitive accuracy would be better for delayed than 
immediate JOLs. 56 participants (46 females, 10 males) completed a paired-
associate learning task, provided immediate and delayed JOLs and completed a 
cued-recall test and Dweck’s (1999) TOI measure. There was no effect of TOI on 
either immediate or delayed JOLs (all p’s > 0.1), negating the first hypothesis. The 
second hypothesis was supported, F(1, 54) = 124.02, p < .001, d = 1.25, replicating 
the delayed-JOL effect. These findings suggest that poor metacognition is not a 
concern for incremental theorists, and speak to the utility of learning techniques that 
use retrieval cues as a basis for study behaviour. 
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It has been established that individuals have implicit, naïve ‘theories’ of 
memory and cognition, which act as an interpretive framework for their 
metacognitive experiences during learning (Schwarz, 2004). Of relevance to the 
present research are the naïve theories that individuals hold about the malleability of 
their own intelligence (Romero, Master, Paunesku, Dweck, & Gross, 2014). Dweck 
and Leggett (1988) have identified two broad views about intelligence that people 
subscribe to; either that it is a fixed entity, or that it has the capacity to grow. The 
results of numerous studies suggest that these theories of intelligence (TOI) have 
differential effects on achievement-related behaviour, with an incremental (growth) 
view consistently associated with superior outcomes (see Claro, Paunesku, & Dweck 
2016; Dweck, 1999). 
However, recent evidence suggests that endorsing such a view may be 
problematic for the accuracy of metacognitive judgements (Miele, Finn, & Molden, 
2011; Miele & Molden, 2010). Metacognition refers to the capacity of the human 
mind to appraise conscious thoughts and experiences, and use the information gained 
via this process to evaluate and adjust behaviour (Nelson, 1996). This practice of 
‘thinking about one’s own thinking’ has important implications for how people learn 
(Nelson, 1996). In particular, it allows an individual to monitor their understanding, 
and use this feedback to evaluate the quality of their memory for information, and 
predict the likelihood of future recall (Dunlosky, Serra, Matvey, & Rawson, 2005; 
Miele & Molden, 2010). These predictions are referred to as judgements of learning 
(JOLs), and are used to inform decisions about what, when, and how to study, 
playing a crucial role in academic achievement (Metcalfe & Finn, 2008). 
The present study aims to investigate the assertion that having an incremental 
view of intelligence can lead to poor JOL accuracy. This is a relatively recent 
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proposition, which, given the importance of accurate metacognitive judgements for 
optimal learning, makes it worthy of further investigation. Not only in order to 
determine the merits of the claim, but also to establish whether there exists a need 
for the development of learning strategies that account for differences in naive TOIs. 
It is hoped that the outcome of this research will contribute to a growing 
understanding of the ways in which psychological mechanisms influence learning 
(Dweck, 2015). Research which explores this concept is vital for the design of both 
effective study techniques and school curricula that account for individual 
differences in learning. It is thus of high practical importance, for policymakers, 
educators, and the wellbeing and success of all learners (Rattan, Savani, Chugh, & 
Dweck, 2015). 
 
Theories of Intelligence, Goals and Effort Attributions 
The Social Cognitive Model of Motivation (Dweck, 1999; Dweck & Leggett, 
1988) suggests that there are two general sets of beliefs, or theories, that people have 
regarding the plasticity of their intelligence. Entity theorists believe that their 
intelligence is fixed at a given level and focus on proving this innate ability, whilst 
incremental theorists believe that their intelligence is malleable and focus on 
increasing it through hard work and effort (Dweck & Leggett, 1988). As such, 
Dweck & Leggett (1988) propose that entity theorists are motivated to demonstrate 
their ability through the pursuit of performance-based goals. These individuals focus 
on validating their intrinsic capabilities, and therefore choose to engage in tasks or 
activities which they believe allow them to demonstrate competence with minimal 
effort (Dweck, 1999). Conversely, incremental theorists are motivated to pursue 
learning goals, as they are focused on incrementally increasing their intelligence, and 
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believe that engaging in novel, effortful, challenging tasks is the best way to achieve 
this (Dweck, 1999).  
These conflicting conceptions about the meaning of effort have implications 
for how entity and incremental theorists respond to situations involving challenge 
and failure (Dweck, 1999). For incremental theorists, these situations signal a need 
to increase effort; to study harder, listen better, practice more (Dweck, 1999). This is 
typically referred to as a mastery-oriented response pattern, as the focus is on 
mastering the task at hand through increased output of physical and mental resources 
(Dweck & Leggett, 1988). This is adaptive in academic settings, as it encourages 
acceptance of the reality that difficulty is a part of the learning process, and therefore 
promotes persistence in the face of setbacks (Dweck & Leggett, 1988). 
In contrast, for those with entity beliefs, the need for high effort indicates low 
ability on a task (Dweck and Leggett, 1988). Performance goals can encourage 
avoidance of learning opportunities, as they present a risk of failure and are thus not 
a means to achieve the central goal of demonstrating competence (Dweck & Leggett, 
1988). As a result, entity theorists tend to use a helpless response pattern, often 
avoiding novel or challenging tasks, for fear that they will perform poorly, as well as 
being hesitant to persevere following failure (Dweck, 1999). It is evident then, that a 
person’s naïve TOI has a profound impact on the types of tasks they engage in and 
their responses to the characteristics of such tasks. It follows that there are 
differences in the degree of learning and academic performance that the two 
mindsets support (Claro et al., 2016; Dweck, 1999). 
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Theories of Intelligence and Achievement 
In studies to date, students with an incremental mindset consistently 
outperform those espousing an entity view. For example, Romero et al. (2014) 
surveyed students at four time points from the end of sixth to the end eighth grade. 
They found that students endorsing incremental beliefs about intelligence had 
consistently higher grades over the duration of the study. Additionally, students who 
held these beliefs in sixth grade were significantly more likely to enrol in advanced 
math courses in seventh and eighth grade, compared to those with fixed beliefs.  
Several studies provide evidence suggesting that this disparity in 
achievement is a behavioral consequence of the different goals, effort attributions, 
and response patterns between the two mindsets (see Dweck, 1999 for a broad 
review). For example, in a sample of middle school students, Blackwell, 
Trzesniewski, and Dweck (2007) found that compared to entity theorists, 
incremental theorists were more likely to pursue learning goals, believe that high 
effort led to high performance and think that a change in study strategy could 
remedy poor performance. Over the two-year duration of their study, these goals and 
beliefs were accompanied by significant improvements in math grades for 
incremental theorists, whilst there was no change in grades for entity theorists.  
This was supportive of previous research by Hong, Chiu, Dweck, Lin, and 
Wan (1999), which found that university students with incremental beliefs attributed 
their task performance significantly more to effort than to ability, whilst those with 
entity beliefs made significantly more ability attributions. Hong et al. also found that 
incremental theorists had far greater intentions to pursue remedial action compared 
to entity theorists (73.3% and 13.3% respectively), when they were told that their 
poor performance was due to low ability. 
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Moreover, Sevincer, Kluge, and Oettingen (2014) used a short-term TOI 
manipulation in a sample of students, to investigate differences in motivational focus 
between those with entity and incremental beliefs. They found that those in the 
incremental condition focused significantly more on the future when elaborating on 
present versus future aspects of their personally relevant academic goals. Sevincer et 
al. argued that this was a reflection of the ‘growth-mindset’ that is supported by an 
incremental TOI. They concluded that this future-oriented focus may allow 
incremental theorists to better recognise and utilise opportunities that support the 
achievement of desired academic goals. 
Given the positive academic outcomes that are associated with incremental 
beliefs, there has been an increase in interventions promoting ‘growth mindsets’ and 
‘cultures of growth’ in educational settings, particularly in the United States of 
America (Dweck, 2015; Rattan, et al., 2015). These interventions are based on the 
notion that naïve TOIs can be changed over the medium to long-term. By explicitly 
teaching students that effort and persistence can improve intelligence by, for 
example, making new connections in the brain, those who view intelligence as fixed 
can come to endorse more incremental beliefs (see Dweck, 1999; Blackwell et al., 
2007, experiment 2).  
However, recent research suggests that there may be a potential downfall to 
having this mindset. In some instances, people with incremental beliefs have been 
shown to have poor metacognitive accuracy compared to those with entity beliefs 
(Miele, et al., 2011; Miele & Molden, 2010). Specifically, they appear to have 
trouble making accurate JOLs when information is particularly easy, and particularly 
difficult (Miele et al., 2011). Whilst it is unlikely that sub-optimal monitoring 
accuracy has the potential to undermine the overall advantages of an incremental 
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TOI, it remains worthy of investigation, given that metacognitive JOLs inform study 
behaviour and have implications for academic performance (Metcalfe & Finn, 2008). 
The following section of this paper provides an explanation of metacognitive 
judgements, in order to inform the subsequent discussion of recent evidence 
suggesting that these judgements may operate differently for entity and incremental 
people. 
 
Metacognitive Accuracy and Delayed JOLs 
It is widely accepted that JOLs are a valid index of metacognitive accuracy 
that represent the perceived likelihood of recall for newly learned information 
(Rhodes & Tauber, 2011). The cue-utilisation view (Koriat, 1993; 2008) proposes 
that learners make judgements about the quality of their learning on the basis of a 
number of mnemonic cues. This includes memory-specific information, such as 
memory quality, as well as interpretations of processing (encoding) fluency at the 
time of learning, and the subjective experience of retrieval fluency when information 
is recalled at a later time (Koriat & Ma’ayan, 2005). JOL accuracy is therefore 
dependent on the validity of these cues for predicting future recall (Koriat & 
Ma’ayan, 2005). When they are a valid indicator of future memory, the accuracy of 
metacognitive judgements will be high, however in the event they are an invalid 
index of later recallability, the accuracy of such judgements will be reduced (Koriat 
& Ma’ayan, 2005). 
Previous research has indicated that people do rely on the assumption that 
subjective feelings of ease during learning are indicative of good learning (Koriat 
2008). Ease of processing can be due to perceptual factors such as stimulus clarity 
and exposure time, or conceptual factors such as concept accessibility or coherence 
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of the information (Miele & Molden, 2010). Both perceptual and conceptual fluency 
make information easier to understand and encode, and have been shown to lead 
people to judge highly fluent information as better learned than information which is 
disfluent (Koriat, 2008; Miele & Molden, 2010). Whilst this may be adaptive as a 
general rule of thumb, high fluency in itself does not guarantee that information will 
be encoded or recalled; it simply increases the likelihood of this occurring (Finn & 
Tauber, 2015). However, given that the subjective experience of processing ease (or 
difficulty) is highly salient immediately after studying new information, it is the 
primary mnemonic cue that people draw on when making immediate JOLs (Koriat & 
Ma’ayan, 2005). In the event that processing fluency is not diagnostic of future 
recall, the often unconscious reliance on this cue when making JOLs can be 
problematic (Koriat & Ma’ayan, 2005). 
In their research investigating influences on metacognitive accuracy, Nelson 
and Dunlosky (1991) found that delaying JOLs leads to substantial gains in JOL 
accuracy. In their experiment, participants viewed sets of unrelated English-English 
word pairs, and gave immediate JOLs for one half of the pairs and delayed JOLs for 
the other half. The immediate JOLs were given following each individual word-pair 
presentation, all of which had a viewing time of 8 seconds (for both immediate and 
delayed). For the delayed JOLs, all pairs were presented first, and then re-presented 
for JOL elicitation. It was found that delayed JOLs were a significantly better 
predictor of actual recall performance than immediate JOLs.  
Nelson and Dunlosky (1991) suggested that a delay of 30 to 60 seconds (see 
also Rhodes & Tauber, 2011) between the presentation of information and the 
elicitation of a JOL, reduces the dependence on processing fluency as a mnemonic 
cue. They proposed in their monitoring dual memories account, that the delay also 
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causes an increased reliance on cues pertaining to the quality of information storage 
in LTM, such as retrieval fluency (see also Kimball and Metcalfe, 2003). This 
improves metacognitive accuracy by permitting a more precise assessment of long-
term memory (LTM) for the relevant information, thus making delayed JOLs a more 
accurate predictor of future memory. 
Since Nelson and Dunlosky’s (1991) pioneering research, the results of 
numerous studies have provided further evidence in support of the so-called 
‘delayed-JOL effect’. A meta-analysis by Rhodes and Tauber (2011) found strong 
support for both the delayed-JOL effect, and the monitoring dual memories account 
in the current literature. A more focused study by Koriat and Ma’ayan (2005, 
experiment 1) found the relative contributions of encoding and retrieval fluency to 
JOLs to be contingent on the timing of JOL elicitation. In this study, immediate 
JOLs were more strongly correlated with encoding fluency (indexed by self-paced 
study time) than retrieval fluency (indexed by retrieval latency). Whilst the reverse 
was true for delayed JOLs, which were more strongly correlated with retrieval 
fluency. Further, a regression analysis on the data indicated that study time made the 
strongest contribution to the prediction of immediate JOLs, whilst the contribution of 
retrieval latency was strongest for delayed JOLs. JOL accuracy also increased with 
the delay, indicating a delayed JOL effect (Koriat & Ma’ayan, 2005).  
Overall, these studies suggest that perceived encoding effort influences 
immediate JOLs, because it is the most salient cue immediately following the 
processing of to-be-remembered information. Whereas perceived retrieval effort 
influences delayed JOLs, as it has the greatest saliency following a recall attempt. 
Further, not only do the processes involved in generating delayed JOLs correspond 
more closely with that of a final recall attempt, they are also arguably a more 
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practical measure of real-world study behaviour compared to immediate JOLs. In the 
majority of instances, people do not study material immediately after processing it, 
but do so after a delay, whether it be hours, days, weeks or even months. For the 
purpose of both accuracy and generalisability, it is therefore beneficial to utilise 
delayed JOLs when investigating study behaviour that occurs outside of controlled 
laboratory environments. 
 
Binary Vs. Scale JOLs. The most commonly used index to measure JOLs is 
the percentage probability scale, on which individuals provide values between 0 and 
100% that represent the perceived probability of future recall for items of 
information (Hanczakowski, Zawadzka, Pasek, & Higham, 2013). However, 
Hanczakowski et al. (2013) provide evidence that this scale measurement may 
introduce systematic bias, leading to an inaccurate representation of JOL accuracy. 
Specifically, their results suggest that when assigning JOLs, individuals use the 0-
100 scale to rank order items for recallability, but do not make frequency judgements 
concerning recall. As such, individuals may often fail to interpret this measurement 
tool in the way that researchers intend. 
Hanczakowski et al’s. (2013) suggest that a binary JOL response format, in 
which individuals respond with either yes or no when predicting whether they will 
recall an item, is a less biased and more realistic measurement. When using binary 
decisions as an index of metacognitive accuracy, high accuracy is reflected by 
responding ‘yes’ to items that are answered correctly on a final recall test, and ‘no’ 
to items that are answered incorrectly. This indicates that a person has the ability to 
discriminate between material that they do, and do not know, and can make accurate 
predictions of their future memory performance on the basis of this information 
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(Hanczakowski et al., 2013). Accuracy is reduced if people recall information which 
they predicted they would not remember, or fail to recall information which they 
predicted that they would remember. Hanczakowski et al. (2013) termed these errors 
‘metacognitive misses’ and ‘metacognitive false alarms’ respectively. 
Specifically, Hanczakowski et al (2013, experiments 1 and 2) found that a 
certain metacognitive bias referred to as the underconfidence-with-practice effect 
(UWP) is evident when JOLs are measured with a probability scale, but not when the 
JOL format is binary. They further demonstrated (experiment 4) that transforming 
the probability scale into a binary scale (0-50% equal to a ‘no’ response and 51-
100% equal to a ‘yes’ response) and re-analyzing the data removed the UWP effect. 
This result was in line with previous research by Dunlosky et al. (2005), who found 
that second-order 0-100 (definitely not accurate/definitely accurate) confidence 
judgements pertaining to first-order scale JOLs did not correspond to JOL values 
(e.g., participants were not 20% confident that they would recall an item give a JOL 
of 20%). Instead, higher second-order judgements were given for JOLs at either 
extreme, suggesting that people may make a yes/no prediction concerning future 
recall, followed by a determination of their level of confidence in this decision using 
the percentage scale (Dunlosky et al., 2005). 
Hanczakowski et al. (2013) therefore concluded that scale and binary 
response formats do not always find equivalent effects, even when measuring the 
same phenomena under the same instructions. Further, they proposed that binary 
JOLs may be a more valid measure of the early cognitive processes that are used by 
individuals to self-monitor their learning. As such, effects that extend from scale to 
binary response formats should be given greater credibility; consistent results across 
measures suggests that the effects are more likely to represent genuine psychological 
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phenomena (Hanczakowski et al., 2013). Consequently, in the event that an effect 
does not generalise across measures, it may be appropriate to question its validity 
(Hanczakowski et al., 2013). 
 
Theories of Intelligence and Metacognitive Accuracy 
Recently, research has come to light suggesting that people’s JOLs may be 
influenced by their beliefs about intelligence (Miele et al., 2011; Miele & Molden, 
2010). In many learning contexts, people are required to process novel, challenging 
material, in order to master new concepts and become familiar with new ideas 
(Miele & Molden, 2010). Resulting decreases in processing fluency that occur from 
encountering unfamiliar or challenging information necessitate an increase in the 
amount of effort that one must exert to process and understand information (Miele & 
Molden, 2010). Given that peoples’ beliefs about the meaning of effort are guided, at 
least in part, by the naïve TOI to which they subscribe (Miele & Molden, 2010), it 
seems reasonable that their JOLs for new information may also be influenced by 
these theories. 
Previous research, such as that by Koriat (2008), has demonstrated that in a 
general sense, individuals do use perceptions of processing fluency to inform their 
JOLs. Koriat found that items studied for longer, and which had more trials to 
acquisition, were given lower JOLs, and did in-fact have a poorer rate of recall. 
Koriat concluded that in instances where perceived processing fluency is a valid cue 
to future memory (i.e., when actual and perceived difficulty correspond), the reliance 
on this so-called easily learned, easily remembered (ELER) heuristic (Koriat, 2008) 
is beneficial for JOL accuracy. In other words, believing that more effortful 
processing is associated with a reduced likelihood of future recall represents the 
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reality of knowledge acquisition, provided that the increase in processing effort is 
due to greater objective difficulty of the information (Koriat, 2008). 
However, recent research has provided evidence that entity and incremental 
beliefs have differential effects on interpretations of processing fluency and 
subsequent JOL accuracy. Miele et al. (2011) (see also Miele & Molden, 2010) 
presented a set of 54 Indonesian-English word pairs with differing levels of 
perceptual similarity (high, moderate, low) to a sample of 75 participants. After 
viewing each word pair (study time was unlimited), participants gave a JOL on a 0-
100 scale that reflected their level of confidence in their ability to recall the English 
word on a future test, where the Indonesian word would be presented alone. The 
results of the final recall test indicated that incremental theorists JOLs were highest 
for difficult, highly engaging items (low similarity) and lowest for easy items (high-
similarity). This appeared to reflect a belief that high task engagement signified 
successful learning, and resulted in under-confident JOLs for easy items and 
overconfident JOLs for difficult items. This was not the case for entity theorists, 
whose JOLs were in line with the ELER heuristic, decreasing with corresponding 
increases in item difficulty, and thus being quite accurate. 
The results of this research indicate that for incremental theorists, subjective 
difficulty in processing may improve the evaluation of a task and its outcome, 
because the associated increase in effort is perceived as a means of reaching their 
current learning goals (i.e., is valuable) (see Brinol, Petty & Tormala, 2006; Labroo 
& Kim, 2009). In contrast, subjective difficulty and effort conflict with entity 
theorist’s performance goals, leading them to negatively evaluate such factors, and 
positively evaluate ease of processing, which fits with their goals and effort beliefs. 
Consequently, Miele et al. (2011) suggested that incremental theorists appear to 
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predominantly use a highly engaged, easily remembered (HEER) heuristic, and that 
this can lead to inaccurate JOLs. They concluded that whilst effort and persistence 
are important, subjective feelings of engagement do not always signify successful 
learning. In the majority of instances, highly engaging information is so because it is 
difficult to process and understand, and is therefore less likely to be remembered. 
Thus, in contrast to the ELER heuristic, the HEER heuristic is unlikely to be (in any 
instance) a valid indicator of future recallability, posing a problem for the 
metacognitive accuracy of incremental theorists. 
So, whilst the literature overwhelmingly indicates that an incremental 
mindset is beneficial for academic achievement, Miele et al. (2011) propose that 
there may be a potential drawback to having incremental beliefs. This is an 
important proposition that warrants further empirical investigation. Not only to 
improve our understanding of how this mechanism may operate, but also to 
determine if there are ways in which metacognitive monitoring can be improved for 
incremental people. 
 
The Present Study 
As such, the present study has three objectives. The first relates to the effect 
of the HEER heuristic on incremental theorists’ JOLs. Theoretical and empirical 
evidence (Miele et al., 2011) suggests that incremental theorists’ interpretations of 
processing fluency may present a possible problem for their metacognition, and this 
has implications for study behaviour in real-world settings. However, Miele et al’s. 
(2011) conclusions were based on immediate JOLs. According to the monitoring 
dual memories account of the delayed-JOL effect (Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991), 
delayed JOLs are less prone to the influence of processing fluency, and are a more 
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accurate representation of future recall performance. As such, this research aims to 
examine whether incremental theorist’s metacognitive accuracy can be improved by 
delaying JOLs. Based on the wealth of research demonstrating the advantages of an 
incremental mindset, we suspect that delaying JOLs may undermine the proposed 
negative effects of the HEER heuristic on incremental theorist’s metacognitive 
accuracy. This finding would suggest that the heuristic is unlikely to have 
problematic impacts on metacognition in applied settings. Such a result would be in 
line with the current literature on the academic achievement of individuals with an 
incremental TOI. 
Second, previous research by Hanczakowski et al., (2013) indicates that the 
binary JOL format does not always detect the same effects as 0-100 scale 
judgements. We are therefore interested in determining if Miele et al’s. (2011) 
findings extend to binary JOLs, or whether they may be an artifact of the scale JOL 
format. To this end, we will employ a response format that uses Yes JOLs to 
represent a recall prediction, and No JOLs to represent a non-recall prediction. 
Third, whilst a literature scan indicates that the delayed-JOL effect has been 
observed with binary JOLs, it appears that this has not been demonstrated nearly as 
thoroughly as with scale JOLs. Given that this effect is extremely robust with scale 
JOLs, and there is at least some evidence to support its existence with a binary 
response format (Wojcik, Waterman, Lestie, Moulin, & Souchay, 2014), an 
additional aim of this research is to replicate the delayed-JOL effect with binary 
JOLs. 
 
Hypotheses. In line with the research objectives, it was hypothesised that the 
accuracy of incremental theorists’ immediate JOLs would be poorer than that of 
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entity theorists, and that this difference would be reduced for delayed JOLs. It was 
also hypothesised that overall metacognitive accuracy would be better for delayed 
JOLs than immediate JOLs. 
 
Method 
Participants and Design 
The sample consisted of 56 participants (46 females, 10 males), aged 
between 18 and 63 (M = 25.2, SD = 10.05), who were recruited, following ethics 
approval (Appendix A), from the University of Tasmania and the wider community. 
Data from an additional 3 participants (original N = 59) was collected, but was 
omitted from all analyses due to non-compliance with experimental instructions. 
University students received course credit for their participation, and all other 
participants were paid 20 dollars. All participants were fluent in English, and 
confirmed that they had little to no knowledge of Indonesian, or similar languages 
(i.e., Malay), as Indonesian words were used in the learning task. The study design 
conformed to a 2 (TOI: entity/incremental) x 2 (timing of JOL: immediate/delayed) 
x 3 (item difficulty: easy/moderate/difficult) mixed factorial design, with TOI as the 
between-subjects variable. 
 
Materials and Procedure 
As shown in Figure 1, the procedure consisted of five stages. These were 
completed in the same order by all participants. The presentation of the study 
material and filler task, and the recording of study choice, study time, and final test 
accuracy were done using e-prime software. All responses were entered manually by 
participants, using the computer keyboard. 
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Figure 1. Chronological depiction of the five stages in the procedure. 
 
 
Study phase with immediate JOLs. Participants gave written informed 
consent prior to completing any tasks (see Appendix B). They were then seated at a 
computer and provided with on-screen information (see Appendix C for full 
transcript), telling them that they would be presented with a series of Indonesian-
English word pairs (see Appendix D). Participants were asked to attempt to 
remember each of the presented word pairs, and told that their memory for them 
would be tested later in the study. In keeping with Miele et al. (2011, experiment 1), 
study-time was self-paced, so as to promote high engagement (and thus, the HEER 
heuristic) by incremental theorists.  
Participants were informed that they would only have the opportunity to 
study each pair once, and that they could not go back and re-study a previous pair 
after choosing to move on. Order of presentation of the word pairs was random for 
all participants. Participants were required to press the space bar in order to move to 
the next screen. Word pairs were presented alone on the screen, and, after choosing 
to cease studying (i.e., pressing the space bar), participants were asked to make an 
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immediate JOL. This involved responding to a prompt which asked whether they 
thought they would be able to recall the English word when presented with the 
Indonesian word alone. Responses were made using the ‘Y’ key, which was used to 
indicate a recall prediction, and the ‘N’ key which indicated a non-recall prediction. 
The word pairs were taken from a paper by Kornell and Son (2009), and were 
used by Miele et al. (2011). In keeping with Miele et al, 54 of the 96 word pairs were 
chosen for inclusion. These were split across 3 levels of difficulty (18 pairs in each), 
to ensure variation in processing fluency. Distinctions between easy, moderate and 
difficult items were based on correlational norming data provided by Kornell and 
Son (see Appendix D). For pairs coded as easy, the two words had high perceptual 
and/or conceptual similarity (e.g., doctor - dokter), for those coded a moderate, most 
of the words were somewhat similar (e.g., sick - sakit), and for those coded as 
difficult, the words were largely dissimilar (e.g., live - tinggal). 
 
 Filler task. Once immediate JOLs had been provided for all 54 word pairs, 
participants completed a 2-minute set of basic math problems (e.g., 7 x 5 + 15). They 
were asked to complete as many as they could in the two minutes. This task was 
designed to prevent rehearsal of the word pairs and allow this information to move 
out of STM, so that the following delayed JOLs would be made using predominantly 
LTM cues. 
 
 Delayed JOL phase. After completing the filler task, participants were then 
presented with the Indonesian word from each pair; presentation order was again 
random. As for the immediate JOLs, they were required to press the space bar to 
move to the next screen. Upon doing so, they were again asked to make a Y/N JOL 
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in response to a prompt asking whether they thought they would be able to recall the 
corresponding English word if presented with the Indonesian counterpart in the 
future. 
 
 Cued recall test. A cued-recall test followed, in which participants were 
presented with the Indonesian word (in a random order), and asked to recall the 
matching English word and type their response. The instructions requested that 
participants make an attempt to recall the target word for each pair, but advised them 
that if they could not remember a word, they were to leave the space blank and press 
the space bar to move to the next word. Accuracy of recall responses was scored by 
two independent raters, and any discrepancies in ratings were discussed and 
resolved. In instances where a response was clearly misspelled (e.g., resteraunt for 
restaurant), it was treated as correct, however responses that were conceptually 
similar but spelled differently (e.g., small for short) were marked as incorrect. 
 
 TOI questionnaire. Following the recall test, participants were asked to fill 
out a pen and paper questionnaire. This comprised a measure of their TOI, in the 
form of Dweck’s (1999) Theories of Intelligence Scale – Self-Form for Adults. This 
is a well validated, 8-item questionnaire that asks people to rate their agreement from 
1 (strongly agree) to 6 (strongly disagree), with each of the statements. Half of the 
statements are worded to have an incremental focus, such as “you can always 
substantially change how intelligent you are”. Whilst the other half are worded to 
have an entity focus, such as “you have a certain amount of intelligence, and you 
can’t really do much to change it”, with entity items being reverse scored. Scores for 
all items are summed, with possible scores ranging from 8 (most entity), to 48 (most 
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incremental) (Miele & Molden, 2010). For the purpose of classifying individuals as 
either entity or incremental, scores can be split at the mid-point (28) of the scale, and 
those below this value classed as entity, and those above, as incremental (Miele & 
Molden, 2010). Inspection of scores in the present case indicated that only 10 
participants scored below the mid-point. As such, a median split was used in place of 
a mid-point split, to allow for a more even distribution of participants between the 
two groups. 
The questionnaire also included three language proficiency questions 
(Appendix E), which were checked prior to data analysis. Although we notified 
participants that it was a requirement of participation that they have minimal 
knowledge of Indonesian or Malay language, these are taught in many school 
curriculums in Tasmania. In addition, the University of Tasmania has a high 
proportion of International students, and we therefore wanted to be certain that 
language knowledge would not confound results. 
 
Results 
SPSS version 23.0 was used to analyse the main and interaction effects, with 
alpha levels set at .05 for comparisons of statistical significance. Effect sizes for all 
pairwise comparisons are reported using Cohen’s d, following Cohen’s (1988) 
criteria of 0.2 as a small effect, 0.5 a moderate effect, and 0.8 as a large effect. 
Initial inspection of skewness statistics indicated both positive and negative 
skew within the levels of recall accuracy and metacognitive accuracy, and positive 
skew within study time. To ensure that this would not undermine the robustness of 
analyses, all data were transformed (variables exhibiting negative skew were 
reflected, transformed and then re-reflected) using both square root and natural 
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logarithm transformations, and skewness statistics and histograms re-computed. 
These indicated that for study time, the log transformations improved the fit to be 
within an acceptable range. For recall accuracy and metacognitive accuracy, the 
square root transformation was the superior of the two, however, it did not 
completely correct the skew, and increased skew for one level of metacognitive 
accuracy. Analyses were run with both the transformed and untransformed variables, 
with both providing equivalent results. Thus, for ease of interpretation, all results 
reported are from the analyses using untransformed data. 
In the current study, TOI was treated as a dichotomous variable (Dweck, 
Chiu, & Hong, 1995; Miele & Molden, 2010, experiment 2) with those below the 
median score of 33 defined as entity, and those above as incremental (scores ranged 
from 15 to 46). However, to ensure that any effects found were not an artifact of this 
approach, data were also analysed using TOI as a continuous moderator variable. 
Following Miele et al. (2011), this was done by conducting ANCOVA on the DV’s, 
using TOI as a covariate. Using ANCOVA did not change the overall interpretation 
of any results, and as such, ANOVAs are reported for ease of interpretation. 
 
Effect of Difficulty 
Difficulty was not the main variable of interest in the analysis, as the study was 
based on the established premise that interpretations of processing effort depend on 
one’s naive TOI (Miele et al., 2011). We were mainly interested in whether the 
effect of this on metacognitive accuracy could be altered by delaying JOLs. 
However, we still needed to establish whether the difficulty levels ascribed to the 
sets of word pairs had an effect on both perceptual fluency and memory for the 
information, to ensure that conclusions made in relation to the hypotheses were 
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validly drawn. 
In order to do this, we conducted analyses on both study time, and the 
accuracy of recall responses. There was a significant effect of difficulty on study 
time, indicating that participants studied difficult word pairs (M = 5226.45, SD = 
3022.69, 95% CI [4421.03, 6031.86]) longer than moderate pairs (M =4695.65, SD = 
2336.37, 95% CI [4067.23, 5324.08], d = 0.17) and moderate pairs longer than easy 
pairs (M = 3072.18, SD = 1247.15, 95% CI [2745.47, 3417.76], d = 0.64), F(1, 75) = 
43.32, p < .001 (following a Greenhouse-Geisser correction). There was also a 
significant effect of difficulty on recall accuracy, with participants recalling more 
words for the easy pairs (M = 0.78, SD = 0.14, 95% CI [ 0.74, 0.82]) than moderate 
pairs (M = 0.29, SD = 0.17, 95% CI [0.25, 0.34], d = 3.04), and more words for 
moderate pairs than difficult pairs (M = 0.13, SD = 0.17, 95% CI [0.08, 0.18], d = 
0.94), F(1, 86) = 590.63, p < .001 (following a Greenhouse-Geisser correction). 
Together, these results indicate that as expected, the level of both perceived and 
actual difficulty of the word pairs increased between the easy, moderate, and 
difficult items.  
 
Effect of Theory of Intelligence x Time Interaction 
Metacognitive accuracy. Following Kornell & Rhodes (2013), an index of 
metacognitive accuracy was obtained by calculating an effect size measure that 
represented participants’ ability to distinguish items they knew from items they did 
not. As depicted in Figure 2, efficient monitoring is represented by an ability to 
make recall predictions for items that are recalled at test, and non-recall predictions 
for items that are not recalled. The effect size used to index efficiency of monitoring 
was Cohen’s w (see Cohen, 1988); a measure designed for use with contingency 
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analyses. It is similar to Cramer’s V, with values falling between 0 and 1, and higher 
values indicating a larger effect (i.e., greater accuracy in present case). The 
magnitude of the effect is interpreted similarly to that of a correlation, with 0.1 
representing a small effect, 0.3 a medium effect, and 0.5 a large effect (Cohen, 
1988).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Accurate metacognitive monitoring is represented by a high  
degree of match between predicted and actual recall.  
 
 
Separate effect size values were obtained for each participant at each level of 
item difficulty, for both immediate and delayed JOLs. However, for a number of 
participants, there was more than one value of 0 in the contingency table 
(particularly for the difficult items), meaning that the effect size could not be 
computed. This considerably reduced the number of data points, and so was 
corrected following Macmillan and Creelman (1991). This involved adding values of 
0.5 to each of the cells containing 0, and for each of these corrections, subtracting 
0.5 from one of the cells containing a positive value (i.e., 10, 8, 0, 0 became 9.5, 7.5, 
0.5, 0.5). 
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Initial correlations between participants’ JOLs and study time indicated that 
overall, there was a weak negative correlation between both immediate JOLs and 
study time, rpb(n = 56) = -0.10, 95% CI [-0.15, -0.05], and delayed JOLs and study 
time, rpb(n = 56) = -0.14, 95% CI [-0.18, -0.10]. Additional bivariate correlations 
revealed that neither the immediate JOL-study time correlations or delayed JOL-
study time correlations exhibited an association with TOI score (p = .841 and p = 
.794 respectively). Thus, all participants tended to make lower JOLs as study time 
(and hence, difficulty) increased. This indicates that both entity and incremental 
people were relying on the ELER heuristic when making JOLs; a finding that is in 
contrast to that of Miele et al. (2011).  
To test the hypothesis that there would be a significant interaction between 
the effect of TOI and the effect of time on metacognitive accuracy, a 2 (TOI: 
entity/incremental) x 2 (timing of JOL: immediate/delayed) x 3 (item difficulty: 
easy/moderate/difficult) ANOVA was performed on the Cohens w values. The 
predicted interaction was not found, with TOI having no significant effect on either 
time or difficulty (all alpha values > 0.1) 
However, as hypothesised, there was a significant main effect of time on the 
accuracy of metacognitive judgements, with accuracy being higher for delayed JOLs 
(M = 0.61 , SD = 0.26, 95% CI [0.56, 0.66]) than immediate JOLs (M = 0.32, SD = 
0.20, 95% CI [0.28, 0.36]), F(1, 54) = 124.02, p < .001, d = 1.25, 95% CI [0.89, 
1.62], replicating the delayed-JOL effect. 
Whilst not central to the main hypothesis of the study, there was also a 
significant main effect of difficulty on metacognitive accuracy, with accuracy being 
higher for moderate word pairs (M = 0.53, SD = , 95% CI [0.48, 0.57]) than for easy 
word pairs (M = 0.47, SD = , 95% CI [0.42, 0.52], d = 0.22), and reducing again for 
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difficult word pairs (M = 0.39, SD = , 95% CI [0.34, 0.44], d = 0.56), F(2, 108) = 
14.44, p < .001. 
These main effects were qualified by a significant interaction between time 
and difficulty, F(2, 108) = 11.50, p < .001, hp2 = 0.18, indicating that the effect of 
time on metacognitive accuracy was not uniform across the easy, moderate, and 
difficult word pairs. Table 1 shows the means, SD’s, and 95% CI’s for the 
interaction. These values show that when JOLs were immediate, participants were 
best at accurately determining what they would and would not remember if the word 
pairs were of a moderate level of difficulty. However, when JOLs were delayed, the 
accuracy of monitoring for easy and moderate words was on par, with that of the 
difficult word pairs remaining considerably lower. 
 
    Table 1 
Mean Accuracy of Immediate and Delayed JOLs at all Three Levels of Item 
Difficulty. 
 
             Immediate                          Delayed       
 
Difficulty 
 
   M (SD)          95% CI 
 
  M (SD)           95% CI
  
        
 
Easy 
 
0.27 (0.19)    [0.22, 0.32] 
 
0.67 (0.24)     [0.61, 0.74] 
 
 
 
         
 
Moderate 
 
 
Difficult 
0.38 (0.19)    [0.33, 0.43] 
 
 
0.30 (0.21)    [0.24, 0.35] 
 
0.67 (0.22)     [0.62, 0.74] 
 
 
 0.48 (0.26)     [0.41, 0.55] 
 
 
 
          
 
 
 
Paired samples t-tests were conducted to follow-up the effects of time 
separately for each level of difficulty, all of which were significant following a 
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Bonferroni adjustment. As illustrated in figure 3, these analyses indicated that the 
improvement in mean metacognitive accuracy between immediate and delayed JOLs 
was greatest for the easy word pairs (M = 0.40, SD = 0.26, 95% CI [0.47, 0.33]), 
t(55) = 11.61, p < .001, d = 1.81, 95% CI [1.36, 2.25] followed by the moderate 
word pairs (M = 0.29, SD = 0.26,  95% CI [0.36, 0.22]), t(55) = 8.41, p < .001, d = 
1.41, 95% CI [1.01, 1.80], being smallest for the difficult word pairs (M = 0.18, SD = 
0.30, 95% CI [0.26, 0.10]), t(55) = 4.56, p < .001, d = 0.78, 95% CI [0.47, 1.09]. 
This shows that the delayed-JOL effect was largest for items which were easy to 
process, and decreased in a linear fashion as items became more difficult. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Mean improvement in metacognitive accuracy between immediate and 
delayed JOLs at each level of word pair difficulty. Error bars show 95% CI’s. 
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Discussion 
The primary aim of the present study was to investigate whether delaying JOLs 
reduced the proposed discrepancy in JOL accuracy between those with an entity 
versus an incremental TOI (Miele et al., 2011). This research contributes to a limited 
body of work that has thus far investigated the effects of TOI on JOLs. Our findings 
do not attest to the idea that entity and incremental theorists rely on different 
heuristics when making JOLs. Possible reasons for the differences in findings 
between the current study and that of Miele et al. (2011) are discussed in section 4.4. 
 
Theories of Intelligence and JOL Accuracy 
The present study was based on that of Miele et al. (2011), whose findings 
suggest that individuals with an incremental (but not an entity) TOI interpret 
processing effort in a way that negatively impacts their metacogntive accuracy. It 
was hypothesised when JOLs were delayed, and relied predominantly on retrieval 
effort, the accuracy of incremental theorists’ JOLs would be more in line with that of 
entity theorists. However, this hypothesis was not supported. Contrary to what was 
expected, there was no difference between the accuracy of entity and incremental 
theorists’ immediate JOLs at any level of item difficulty (i.e., processing effort). 
Consequently, there was no discrepancy that stood to be improved by delaying JOLs. 
 
Cue validity and heuristics. Whilst these results do not support the notion 
that incremental theorists utilise a HEER heuristic to guide their metacognitive 
judgements, they do demonstrate the validity of the ELER heuristic as a basis for 
JOLs. Our data indicate that study time was positively associated with item 
difficulty, whilst recall accuracy was negatively associated with difficulty. This is in 
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line with research showing that item difficulty affects the degree of effort needed to 
process and encode information, and that difficult information is harder to remember 
(i.e., ELER) (Koriat, 2008). 
Further, study time was negatively correlated with JOLs for both entity and 
incremental theorists, suggesting that individuals use this heuristic to monitor their 
mastery of information, irrespective of their TOI (Koriat, 2008). It should however 
be noted that the magnitude of this correlation was weak (rpb = -0.1) and our sample 
quite incremental (with the median split 5 points above the mid point of the scale). It 
is therefore possible that incremental theorists use the ELER heuristic to a lesser 
degree than entity theorists, and may exhibit smaller decreases in JOLs as study time 
(and thus difficulty) increases. Nonetheless, it is evident that incremental theorists 
were not making higher JOLs as study time increased (or lower JOLs as it 
decreased), and were thus not guided by HEER principles. 
It should also be noted that the ELER heuristic is only adaptive insofar as the 
perceived level of task difficulty is diagnostic of actual difficulty (Koriat, 2008), as 
in the present case. The reliance on perceptual cues, and associated heuristics such as 
ELER, appears to be a relatively automatic process. As such, previous research has 
found that manipulating perceived difficulty by altering font size, or sentence 
coherence (Miele et al., 2011; Miele & Molden, 2010), can negatively impact 
metacognitive accuracy. Such manipulations do not impact the actual difficulty of 
the presented information, and can therefore deceive metacognitive judgements 
(Miele & Molden, 2010). It would be interesting to replicate this study, manipulating 
only perceptions of item difficulty, and observe whether participants show evidence 
of ELER for immediate judgements, but are able to correct this when JOLs are made 
at a delay. 
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In Support of the Delayed-JOL Effect 
Whilst it was not the main focus of the present study, the accuracy of 
participants’ JOLs was found to significantly increase when JOLs were made at a 
delay, supporting the delayed-JOL effect and thus, the second hypothesis. This 
demonstrates that people are better able to judge what they will and will not 
remember when these judgements are based on a retrieval attempt, opposed to 
interpretations of processing fluency. This finding is in line with that of Nelson and 
Dunlosky (1991), and the extensive body of literature that has since demonstrated 
the robustness of this effect. Additionally, the present study establishes that the 
delayed-JOL effect is evident with binary JOLs. This contributes to a seemingly 
scarce amount of evidence supporting the reliability of this effect with binary 
judgements (see section 4.3). 
 
Word pair difficulty and monitoring accuracy. The results of the present 
study did reveal an unusual effect of difficulty on metacognitive accuracy. Research 
has demonstrated that JOL accuracy tends to be higher for information that is easier 
to process (see Koriat, Ma’ayan, & Nussinson, 2006, experiment 1). However, in the 
present study, accuracy was poorer for the easy words than for the moderate words 
when JOLs were immediate, and no different when JOLs were delayed. This 
indicates that, even following the improvement in accuracy that resulted from 
delaying JOLs, there was no advantage in accuracy (i.e., reduced number of 
metacognitive misses and false alarms) (Hanczakowski et al., 2013) for the word 
pairs that were easiest to process, when compared to those that were somewhat more 
difficult. This is contrary to what would be expected based on the literature, and as 
dicussed in section 4.4, is likely to be the result of a methodological issue with the 
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categorisation of word pairs, not a genuine effect of difficulty. 
 There was however a standard effect of difficulty for the difficult word pairs, 
as the increase in accuracy between immediate and delayed JOLs was lowest for 
these items. This is in line with previous research showing that JOL accuracy 
reduces as information becomes more effortful to process (Koriat et al., 2006). This 
indicates that unsurprisingly, learners struggle more when determining how well 
they will remember novel, challenging information, compared to that which is more 
closely related to their exisiting knowledge (Metcalfe, 2011). 
 
Binary JOL Format 
The results of the present study also lend support to the proposition that the 
binary JOL format does not always find effects that are evident with a scale format 
(Hanczakowski et al., 2013). We have no means of direct comparison between 
binary and scale JOLs in our sample and thus cannot be sure whether a scale JOL 
measure would have found the same, or different results. However, minimal research 
has thus far demonstrated evidence of the HEER heuristic, and in instances where it 
has been detected (Miele et al., 2011; Miele & Molden, 2010), a scale format has 
been employed. It is of course possible that the scale response format is measuring a 
true effect that the binary format fails to detect. However, this seems unlikely, given 
that past research (Dunlosky et al., 2005; Hanczakowski et al., 2013) suggests binary 
judgements are a more accurate representation of early cognitive processes than 
scale JOLs.  
Further, the delayed-JOL effect has been well established with a scale JOL 
format, and was clearly evident with the binary format employed here, supporting 
the idea that robust effects generalise across response formats. It would be beneficial 
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for future research investigating the HEER heuristic to employ both scale and binary 
JOL formats, to allow comparison across the two measures. If the heuristic is found 
with scale but not binary JOLs, it would be pertinent to question its validity 
(Hanczakowski et al., 2013). 
 
Limitations 
There are methodological limitations in the current study that may have 
contributed to the differences in findings between the current study and that of Miele 
et al. (2011). These are noted as they limit the validity of the current findings, and 
may provide directions for future research. 
 
Theory of intelligence measure. It was not uncommon for participants to 
strongly endorse both entity and incremental statements on Dweck’s (1999) TOI 
scale. As such, it is possible that the scale did not provide a true measurement of 
many participants TOIs. Dweck (1999) acknowledges that the combination of entity 
and incremental statements can confuse participants, but suggests that this is mostly 
a concern with school-aged children. A short version of the scale containing only the 
entity statements (measuring extent of agreement/disagreement) has been validated 
to address this issue (see Dweck, 1999). As this was not deemed to be a concern in 
the present study, the complete version of the scale was administered, however, in 
retrospect, the shortened version may have been more effective. Additonally, this 
makes it is unclear whether the lack of variability in TOI scores in our sample (i.e., 
few people endorsing entity views) was an artifact of the TOI measure, or a true lack 
of variability. 
Additionally, whilst both the present study and Miele et al. (2011) used 
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Dweck’s (1999) scale, it it worth noting that Castella and Byrne (2015) propose that 
a general belief in the malleability of intelligence does not necessarily equate to 
believing that one’s own ability can change. As such, they have recently produced a 
version of this scale which uses first-person statements (e.g., “I believe I can always 
substantially improve my intelligence”). Their research demonstrates that this 
version predicts unique variance in achievement goals and attributions beyond that 
of Dweck’s version, which they propose may measure intelligence beliefs more 
generally (Castella & Byrne, 2015). Thus, we cannot be certain that participants 
were responding to the statements in a way that reflected their beliefs about their 
own intelligence.  
 
Categorisation of word pairs. Further, as previously mentioned, there may 
have been an issue with the categorisation of word pairs that inadvertently improved 
monitoring accuracy for moderate items. Given that the aim was to replicate Miele et 
al. (2011), we used the same stimuli with the same three levels of difficulty. 
However, the moderate category proved quite challenging to classify (Miele et al., 
2011 did not provide the words they used for each difficulty level), with few word 
pairs being of an intermediate level of processing fluency, and the norming data 
based on a small number of observations. As such, the fluency of some word pairs 
allocated to the moderate category may have been closer to the ‘easy’ level, whilst 
that of others, closer to the ‘difficult’ level. It is possible that this lead to greater 
variation between items within the moderate category, making discrimination 
between those that would, and would not be remembered, an easier task, and 
increasing overall monitoring accuracy for this category. Future research would 
benefit from using a less ambiguous set of cross-linguistic word pairs, or removing 
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the moderate category and comparing only easy and difficult items. 
 
Goal-driven processing. Finally, in the introductory section of this paper, 
metacognition was defined as the process of appraising subjective experiences, and 
using the information gained via this process to evaluate and adjust behaviour 
(Nelson, 1996). It therefore comprises two main functions; one being the bottom-up 
monitoring of conscious experience, and the other, the top-down control of adaptive, 
appropriate responses (Koriat et al., 2006). In the context of the present study, the 
inherent difficulty (processing fluency) of the presented word pairs acted as a 
bottom-up influence on monitoring, whilst existing variations in TOI represented a 
top-down framework, that served to guide the interpretation of this information.  
As a primary aim of the present study was to replicate Miele et al. (2011, 
experiment 1), with the addition of delayed JOLs, we adhered as much as possible to 
their methodology. This meant manipulating item difficulty to ensure that there were 
differences in processing fluency to elicit the heuristic mechanim (i.e., HEER) that 
was of primary interest in this research. However, this also meant that we followed 
Miele et al’s assumption that self-paced study time was sufficient to encourage the 
active use of implicit goal frameworks (learn versus perform) that form the 
cornerstone of the incremental and entity TOIs. In other words, we assumed that 
giving participants unlimited time to do the tasks would ensure that they made 
genuine attempts at learning the material, and that their interpretations of processing 
fluency would be guided by their level of task engagement. It is possible that 
(contrary to Miele et al’s assertion), simply allowing study time to be self-paced was 
not sufficient to encourage true, goal-driven regulation of metacognitive behaviour. 
If this is so, participants may not have engaged enough in the task to employ the 
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HEER heuristic. 
Future research investigating the HEER heuristic would do well to employ a 
controlled manipulation, such as a task incentive (i.e., additional payment for higher 
scores on the final test), to encourage the use of implicit goal frameworks (learn 
versus perform) (Koriat et al., 2006). Whilst the participants in the current study 
were allocated research credits or paid for their time, this was not conditional on 
their task performance and as such, may have not have impacted performance in the 
way a task-specific incentive would. Whilst Miele et al. (2011) found evidence of the 
HEER heuristic with self-paced study time and without the use of an incentive, this 
does not guarantee that the self-paced study method is reliable. It is feasible that if 
this heuristic does have real practical implications for incremental theorists 
metacognition, these would be evident in situations which thoroughly engage their 
cognitive resources, and encourage them to focus on their positive beliefs about 
effort. We cannot be certain that this occurred in the present case. 
 
Implications 
The current research suggests that naïve TOIs do not have differential effects 
on JOLs. This is not to say that they do not differentially affect other cognitive 
processes, including values, attiitudes, and motivations. It is clear from the work of 
many researchers that these factors do change depending on once’s core beliefs 
about intelligence, and its capacity to grow and change (Blackwell et al., 2008; Claro 
et al., 2016; Dweck, 1999; Dweck & Leggett, 1988). The present results simply 
speak to the idea that an incremental TOI does not negatively impact metacognition, 
and that the positives that stand to be gained from having such a mindset far 
outweigh any negatives. This has implications for approaches to education, as it 
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suggests that encouraging growth at the policy, classroom, and individual level can 
have far-reaching positive impacts (see Dweck, 2015). 
The present study also demonstrates that learners benefit greatly by delaying 
their JOLs. This is not a novel finding, but is nonetheless an important one, that 
supports the utility of study techniques such as distributed practice and self-testing 
for enhancing learning and memory (Finn & Tauber, 2015). These techniques 
encourage learners to delay judgements, and promote the use of retrieval practice for 
informing future study choices (Dunlosky, Rawson, Marsh, Nathan, & Willingham, 
2013). 
 
Conclusion 
In contrast to Miele et al. (2011), the present study does not support the 
proposition that individuals with an incremental TOI use the HEER heuristic. The 
present results instead indicate that the ELER heuristic is used by both entity and 
incremental theorists, and that it is beneficial for JOL accuracy insofar as it validly 
indexes item difficulty. The present study also demonstrates that irrespective of TOI, 
even a slight delay (at least 2 minutes) between the presentation of information and 
the elicitation of a JOL dramatically improves the accuracy of self-monitoring during 
learning. 
The practical value of these findings lies in informing approaches to learning 
at the policy, classroom, and individual level. Primarily, this study suggests that an 
incremental mindset does not damage metacognition, and is thus overwhelmingly 
beneficial for academic success. As such, it is a worthy use of resources to 
implement programs and curricula in schools, that focus on individual growth, and 
foster a belief in the importance of effort in a learning context (Dweck, 2015). This 
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research also speaks to the utility of learning techniques that use retrieval cues as a 
basis for study behaviour. 
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Appendix B – Participant information sheet and consent form 
Judgements  of  Learning  and  Memory  
Information  Sheet  for  Participants  
1.  Invitation  
We  would  like  to  invite  you  to  participate  in  a  psychology  experiment  about  
judgements  of  learning  and  memory.  The  experiment  is  being  conducted  in  
partial  fulfillment  of  an  honours  degree,  by  University  of  Tasmania  students  
Caitlin  Gleeson  and  Terry  Purton  under  the  supervision  of  Dr.  Matthew  
Palmer  of  the  Division  of  Psychology  at  the  University  of  Tasmania.  
2.  What  is  the  purpose  of  this  study?  
The  experiment  is  investigating  factors  that  affect  people’s  memory  for  
English/foreign  language  word  pairs.  
3.  Why  have  I  been  invited  to  participate?  
For  this  experiment,  we  are  looking  for  people  aged  18  years  or  more  who  
have  normal  or  corrected  to  normal  vision  (i.e.,  glasses  or  contact  lenses  are  
fine).  
Participation  in  this  study  is  voluntary  –  you  are  entirely  free  to  choose  to  
participate  or  not,  and  there  will  be  no  consequences  if  you  decide  not  to  
participate.  If  you  do  participate,  any  information  you  provide  will  be  
anonymous  and  no  participants  in  the  experiment  will  be  individually  
identifiable.  
4.  What  will  I  be  asked  to  do?  
Participation  would  require  approximately  1  hour  of  your  time  on  only  one  
occasion  and  would  take  place  in  a  room  in  the  Psychology  building  on  the  
UTAS  campus.  The  experiment  involves  viewing  a  series  of  word  pairs  and  
then  answering  some  questions  about  them.  Participants  will  also  be  asked  
to  complete  a  brief  questionnaire  about  themselves.  
5.  Are  there  any  possible  benefits  from  participation  in  this  study?  
The  results  of  this  experiment  will  help  us  to  understand  what  factors  affect  
people’s  memory  for  a  variety  of  items  and  events.  This  information  will  be  
useful,  for  example,  in  developing  better  ways  to  present  information  in  
classes.  You  would  be  reimbursed  for  your  time  with  a  payment  of  $20  or  1  
hour  of  research  credit.  
6.  Are  there  any  possible  risks  from  participation  in  this  study?  
There  are  no  foreseeable  risks  associated  with  participating  in  this  study.  
7.  What  if  I  change  my  mind  during  or  after  the  study?  
That’s  fine  -­  you  are  free  to  withdraw  from  the  study  at  any  time,  and  without  
providing  an  explanation.  If  you  choose  to  withdraw  during  the  study,  your  
responses  will  be  destroyed.  If  you  complete  the  study,  you  will  not  be  able  
to  withdraw  your  data  because  it  will  be  stored  in  anonymous  form  (and  so  
we  will  not  be  able  to  identify  which  responses  are  yours).  
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8.  What  will  happen  to  the  information  when  this  study  is  over?  
The  data  from  this  study  will  be  kept  in  secure  storage  on  the  University  of  
Tasmania  premises  for  a  period  of  five  years  after  any  publications  (e.g.,  in  
academic  journals)  that  involve  the  data.  After  this  period,  the  data  will  be  
archived.  Only  the  researcher  will  have  access  to  the  raw  data.  
The  data  will  be  stored  anonymously.  All  responses  will  be  anonymous  and  
no  identifying  information  will  be  collected  from  participants.  
9.  How  will  the  results  of  the  study  be  published?  
The  results  of  the  study  will  be  published  in  an  academic  journal.  Once  the  
study  has  been  completed,  you  will  be  able  to  access  the  results  by  visiting  
the  website  below:  
http://www.utas.edu.au/psychology/research/research-­project-­reports  
No  individual  participants  will  be  identifiable  in  the  publication  of  the  results.  
10.   What  if  I  have  questions  about  this  study?  
If  you  have  any  questions  about  this  study,  please  feel  free  to  contact  us  via  
phone  on  (03)  6324  3004  (Matthew  Palmer)  or  by  email:  
matthew.palmer@utas.edu.au  or  cl0@utas.edu.au  or  tpurton@utas.edu.au    
  
This  study  has  been  approved  by  the  Tasmanian  Social  Sciences  Human  
Research  Ethics  Committee.  If  you  have  concerns  or  complaints  about  the  
conduct  of  this  study,  please  contact  the  Executive  Officer  of  the  HREC  
(Tasmania)  Network  on  (03)  6226  7479  or  email  human.ethics@utas.edu.au.  
The  Executive  Officer  is  the  person  nominated  to  receive  complaints  from  
research  participants.  Please  quote  ethics  reference  number  H0012660.  
This  information  sheet  is  for  you  to  keep.  If  you  would  like  to  
participate  in  this  study,  please  ask  the  researcher  for  a  Consent  Form  
to  complete.  
  
Thank  you  for  your  attention  -­  your  time  is  very  much  appreciated!  
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Judgements  of  Learning  and  Memory  
Participant  Consent  Form  
  
1.   I  agree  to  take  part  in  the  research  study  named  above.  
2.   I  have  read  and  understood  the  Information  Sheet  for  this  study.  
3.   The  nature  and  possible  effects  of  the  study  have  been  explained  to  
me.  
4.   I  understand  that  the  study  involves  viewing  a  series  of  word  pairs  and  
answering  questions  about  them.  
5.   I  understand  that  participation  involves  no  foreseeable  risks.  
6.   I  understand  that  all  research  data  will  be  securely  stored  on  the  
University  of  Tasmania  premises  for  five  years  from  the  publication  of  
the  study  results,  and  will  then  be  destroyed  unless  I  give  permission  
for  my  data  to  be  archived.  
I  agree  to  have  my  study  data  archived.  (Note  that  your  data  will  be  
stored  anonymously.)  
Yes        No       
7.   Any  questions  that  I  have  asked  have  been  answered  to  my  
satisfaction.  
8.   I  understand  that  the  researchers  will  maintain  confidentiality  and  that  
any  information  I  supply  to  the  researcher  will  be  used  only  for  the  
purposes  of  the  research.  
9.   I  understand  that  the  results  of  the  study  will  be  published  so  that  I  
cannot  be  identified  as  a  participant.    
10.  I  understand  that  my  participation  is  voluntary  and  that  I  may  withdraw  
at  any  time  without  any  effect.    
I  understand  that  I  will  not  be  able  to  withdraw  my  data  after  
completing  the  experiment  as  my  data  will  be  anonymous.  
  
  
Participant’s  name:    
_______________________________________________________    
  
Participant’s  signature:  
____________________________________________________  
  
Date:    ________________________  
Statement  by  Investigator     
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   I  have  explained  the  project  and  the  implications  of    
participation  in  it  to  this  volunteer  and  I  believe  that  the    
consent  is  informed  and  that  he/she  understands  the    
implications  of  participation.  
  
If  the  Investigator  has  not  had  an  opportunity  to  talk  to  participants    
prior  to  them  participating,  the  following  must  be  ticked.  
   The  participant  has  received  the  Information  Sheet  where    
my  details  have  been  provided  so  participants  have  had    
the  opportunity  to  contact  me  prior  to  consenting  to  participate  
in  this  project.  
  
Investigator’s  name:    
_______________________________________________________    
  
Investigator’s  signature:  
____________________________________________________  
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Appendix C – Transcript of participant instructions 
Introduction 
Welcome to the study. Thank-you for taking the time to participate. Press the 
SPACE BAR to continue. 
During the first part of the study, you will be presented with 54 word pairs. One of 
the words will be an English word, the other, it’s counterpart in Indonesian. 
Press the SPACE BAR to continue. 
Please go through the list in your own time, and do your best to learn each pair. You 
will only have to opportunity to view each pair once. You will be tested on 
your memory of each word pair later in the study. Press the SPACE BAR to 
continue. 
Immediate JOL instructions 
After studying each word pair, you will be asked whether you think you would be 
able to recall the English word from the pair, if presented with the Indonesian 
word only. Press the SPACE BAR to continue. 
Please note that once you have made your decision and pressed the space bar, you 
cannot go back. To begin the study phase, press the SPACE BAR. 
Immediate JOL prompt 
Do you think you would be able to recall the corresponding English word for this 
pair?  
Y = Yes, N = No. Please use the keyboard to enter your answer, and press the 
SPACE BAR to continue. 
Filler task instructions 
The first phase of the study is now complete. During the next part of the 
study, you will be asked to solve some math problems. Please try to complete as 
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many as you can within the 2 minutes. Press the SPACE BAR when you are ready to 
begin. 
Post-filler task prompt 
This phase of the study is now complete. Press the SPACE BAR to continue. 
Delayed JOL instructions 
 During the next part of the study, you will be shown the Indonesian word 
from each word pair. Please tell us again whether you think you would be able to 
recall the English word. When you are ready to begin, press the SPACE BAR. 
Delayed JOL prompt 
 Do you think you would be able to recall the corresponding English word for 
this pair?  
Y = Yes, N = No. Please use the keyboard to enter your answer, and press the 
SPACE BAR to continue. 
Cued recall test instructions 
 During the next part of the study, you will be shown the Indonesian word from 
each word pair, and asked to RECALL the English word. Use the keyboard to type in 
your answer, and press the SPACE BAR to move to the next word. Press the SPACE 
BAR when you are ready to begin. 
Recall prompt 
 Use the keyboard to enter the corresponding English word. Press the SPACE 
BAR to continue. 
Closing statement 
 The experiment is now finished. Thank-you for your time. If you have any 
questions or feedback, please see the researcher. 
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Appendix D – Word pair stimuli 
Indonesian-English word pairs taken from Kornell & Son (2009).  
The first two columns are the word pairs used. The last two columns contain the 
norming data, but, as shown, this is based on less than 10 observations. 
 
Difficult Indonesian English Accuracy Observations 
 Terlambat Late 0 6 
 Tinggal Live 0 6 
 Perhiasan Jewellery 0 6 
 Keberangka Departure 0 7 
 Bagaimana How 0 8 
 Sandiwara Theatre 0 6 
 Angin Wind 0 3 
 Pembalut Bandage 0 7 
 Sungai River 0.12 8 
 Sabun Soap 0.17 6 
 Telur Egg 0.17 6 
 Baru New 0.17 6 
 Jelek Bad 0.2 5 
 Basah Wet 0.2 5 
 Duduk Sit 0.25 8 
 Kacamata Eyeglasses 0.25 8 
 Kelapa Coconut 0.25 8 
 Danau Lake 0.29 7 
     
Moderate Tinggi Tall 0.33 6 
 Bagasi Luggage 0.33 6 
 Handuk Towel 0.38 8 
 Ombak Wave 0.38 8 
 Debu Dust 0.38 8 
 Rendah Short 0.4 5 
 Panas Hot 0.43 7 
 Restoran Restaurant 0.43 7 
 Sekolah School 0.43 7 
 Jahe Ginger 0.44 9 
 Besar Big 0.5 6 
 Asli Authentic 0.5 6 
 Coro Cockroach 0.5 8 
 Sakit Sick 0.57 7 
 Sutera Silk 0.57 7 
 Reservasi Reservation 0.6 5 
 Pesta Party 0.6 5 
 Sapi Cow 0.6 5 
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Easy Turis Tourist 0.62 8 
 Fotokopi Photocopy 0.62 8 
 Botol Bottle 0.67 6 
 Bon Bill 0.71 7 
 Telepon Telephone 0.83 6 
 Guru Teacher 0.86 7 
 Dokter Doctor 0.86 7 
 Buku Book 0.86 7 
 Gelas Glass 0.88 8 
 Tekstil Textile 0.88 8 
 Foto Photograph 0.89 9 
 Taksi Taxi 0.89 9 
 Wanita Woman 1 6 
 Bis Bus 1 7 
 Polisi Police 1 8 
 Bir Beer 1 8 
 Sama Same 1 6 
 Sandel Sandal 1 6 
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Appendix E – Language proficiency questions 
Language History Questions 
 
1.   What language do you predominantly speak at home? 
______________________ 
 
 
2.   Can you speak Indonesian fluently?   YES / NO   (please circle) 
 
 
3.   Have you ever studied Indonesian?    YES / NO  (please circle) 
 
3a. For what length of time did you study it (approx.)? 
 
____________________________________________________________ 
 
3b. How long ago did you study it (approx.)? 
 
_____________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix F 
 
SPSS Data Output 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.#difficulty!
Measure:!!!MEASURE_1!! 
difficulty! Mean! Std.!Error!
95%!Confidence!Interval!
Lower!Bound! Upper!Bound!
1! .780! .019! .742! .819!
2! .292! .023! .245! .339!
3! .131! .023! .084! .178!
!
!
3.#difficulty!
Measure:!!!MEASURE_1!! 
difficulty! Mean! Std.!Error!
95%!Confidence!Interval!
Lower!Bound! Upper!Bound!
1! 3081.614! 167.665! 2745.466! 3417.762!
2! 4695.654! 313.448! 4067.228! 5324.080!
3! 5226.446! 401.728! 4421.029! 6031.863!
! Tests%of%Within,Subjects%Effects!
Measure:!!!MEASURE_1!! 
Source!
Type!III!Sum!of!
Squares! df! Mean!Square! F! Sig.!
Partial!Eta!
Squared!
difficulty! Sphericity!Assumed! 12.750! 2! 6.375! 590.625! .000! .916!
GreenhouseKGeisser! 12.750! 1.591! 8.015! 590.625! .000! .916!
HuynhKFeldt! 12.750! 1.662! 7.673! 590.625! .000! .916!
LowerKbound! 12.750! 1.000! 12.750! 590.625! .000! .916!
difficulty!*!TOIgroup! Sphericity!Assumed! .001! 2! .000! .037! .964! .001!
GreenhouseKGeisser! .001! 1.591! .001! .037! .936! .001!
HuynhKFeldt! .001! 1.662! .000! .037! .942! .001!
LowerKbound! .001! 1.000! .001! .037! .848! .001!
Error(difficulty)! Sphericity!Assumed! 1.166! 108! .011!    
GreenhouseKGeisser! 1.166! 85.904! .014!    
HuynhKFeldt! 1.166! 89.729! .013!    
LowerKbound! 1.166! 54.000! .022!    
a.!Computed!using!alpha!=!.05!
! Tests%of%Within,Subjects%Effects!
Measure:!!!MEASURE_1!! 
Source!
Type!III!Sum!of!
Squares! df! Mean!Square! F! Sig.!
Partial!Eta!
Squared!
difficulty! Sphericity!Assumed! 139047473.497! 2! 69523736.749! 43.322! .000! .445!
GreenhouseLGeisser! 139047473.497! 1.387! 100279757.011! 43.322! .000! .445!
HuynhLFeldt! 139047473.497! 1.438! 96706189.851! 43.322! .000! .445!
LowerLbound! 139047473.497! 1.000! 139047473.497! 43.322! .000! .445!
difficulty!*!TOIgroup! Sphericity!Assumed! 5020088.260! 2! 2510044.130! 1.564! .214! .028!
GreenhouseLGeisser! 5020088.260! 1.387! 3620441.409! 1.564! .219! .028!
HuynhLFeldt! 5020088.260! 1.438! 3491423.441! 1.564! .218! .028!
LowerLbound! 5020088.260! 1.000! 5020088.260! 1.564! .216! .028!
Error(difficulty)! Sphericity!Assumed! 173320611.635! 108! 1604820.478!    
GreenhouseLGeisser! 173320611.635! 74.876! 2314763.491!    
HuynhLFeldt! 173320611.635! 77.643! 2232274.632!    
LowerLbound! 173320611.635! 54.000! 3209640.956!    
a.!Computed!using!alpha!=!.05!
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Correlations  
 
IJOL  Point  biserial  
correlation   TOI  Score  
IJOL  Point  biserial  correlation   Pearson  Correlation   1   .027  
Sig.  (2-­tailed)    .841  
N   56   56  
TOI  Score   Pearson  Correlation   .027   1  
Sig.  (2-­tailed)   .841    
N   56   56  
Correlations  
 
IJOL  Point  biserial  
correlation   TOI  Score  
IJOL  Point  biserial  correlation   Pearson  Correlation   1   .027  
Sig.  (2-­tailed)    .841  
N   56   56  
TOI  Score   Pearson  Correlation   .027   1  
Sig.  (2-­tailed)   .841    
N   56   56  
Correlations!
 TOI!Score!
DJOL!Point!
biserial!correlation!
TOI!Score! Pearson!Correlation! 1! 7.036!
Sig.!(27tailed)!  .794!
N! 56! 56!
DJOL!Point!biserial!correlation! Pearson!Correlation! 7.036! 1!
Sig.!(27tailed)! .794!  
N! 56! 56!
!
Correlations!
 
IJOL!Point!biserial!
correlation! TOI!Score!
IJOL!Point!biserial!correlation! Pearson!Correlation! 1! .027!
Sig.!(2<tailed)!  .841!
N! 56! 56!
TOI!Score! Pearson!Correlation! .027! 1!
Sig.!(2<tailed)! .841!  
N! 56! 56!
!
Descriptive*Statistics!
 Mean! Std.!Deviation! N!
IJOL!Point!biserial!correlation! 9
.10099635899829
5!
.19836369697550
9!
56!
TOI!Score! 32.73! 6.496! 56!
!
Descriptive*Statistics!
 Mean! Std.!Deviation! N!
TOI!Score! 32.73! 6.496! 56!
DJOL!Point!biserial!correlation! A
.14020990148327
6!
.16439669038574
5!
56!
!
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7.#time#*#difficulty!
Measure:!!!MEASURE_1!! 
time! difficulty! Mean! Std.!Error!
95%!Confidence!Interval!
Lower!Bound! Upper!Bound!
1! 1! .271! .026! .218! .323!
2! .381! .026! .329! .433!
3! .298! .028! .242! .354!
2! 1! .670! .032! .605! .735!
2! .676! .030! .615! .736!
3! .484! .035! .413! .554!
!
!
!
!
5.!time!
Measure:!!!MEASURE_1!! 
time! Mean! Std.!Error!
95%!Confidence!Interval!
Lower!Bound! Upper!Bound!
1! .317! .019! .278! .355!
2! .610! .025! .559! .661!
!
3.#difficulty!
Measure:!!!MEASURE_1!! 
difficulty! Mean! Std.!Error!
95%!Confidence!Interval!
Lower!Bound! Upper!Bound!
1! .470! .024! .422! .518!
2! .528! .022! .484! .572!
3! .391! .024! .342! .440!
!
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!
Tests%of%Within,Subjects%Effects!
Measure:!!!MEASURE_1!! 
Source!
Type!III!Sum!of!
Squares! df! Mean!Square! F! Sig.!
Partial!Eta!
Squared!
time! Sphericity!Assumed! 7.182! 1! 7.182! 124.017! .000! .697!
GreenhouseKGeisser! 7.182! 1.000! 7.182! 124.017! .000! .697!
HuynhKFeldt! 7.182! 1.000! 7.182! 124.017! .000! .697!
LowerKbound! 7.182! 1.000! 7.182! 124.017! .000! .697!
time!*!TOIgroup! Sphericity!Assumed! .053! 1! .053! .920! .342! .017!
GreenhouseKGeisser! .053! 1.000! .053! .920! .342! .017!
HuynhKFeldt! .053! 1.000! .053! .920! .342! .017!
LowerKbound! .053! 1.000! .053! .920! .342! .017!
Error(time)! Sphericity!Assumed! 3.127! 54! .058!    
GreenhouseKGeisser! 3.127! 54.000! .058!    
HuynhKFeldt! 3.127! 54.000! .058!    
LowerKbound! 3.127! 54.000! .058!    
difficulty! Sphericity!Assumed! 1.063! 2! .531! 14.439! .000! .211!
GreenhouseKGeisser! 1.063! 1.895! .561! 14.439! .000! .211!
HuynhKFeldt! 1.063! 1.999! .532! 14.439! .000! .211!
LowerKbound! 1.063! 1.000! 1.063! 14.439! .000! .211!
difficulty!*!TOIgroup! Sphericity!Assumed! .000! 2! .000! .003! .997! .000!
GreenhouseKGeisser! .000! 1.895! .000! .003! .996! .000!
HuynhKFeldt! .000! 1.999! .000! .003! .997! .000!
LowerKbound! .000! 1.000! .000! .003! .954! .000!
 
 
!
Error(difficulty). Sphericity.Assumed. 3.974. 108. .037.    
Greenhouse@Geisser. 3.974. 102.347. .039.    
Huynh@Feldt. 3.974. 107.926. .037.    
Lower@bound. 3.974. 54.000. .074.    
time.*.difficulty. Sphericity.Assumed. .638. 2. .319. 11.495. .000. .176.
Greenhouse@Geisser. .638. 1.957. .326. 11.495. .000. .176.
Huynh@Feldt. .638. 2.000. .319. 11.495. .000. .176.
Lower@bound. .638. 1.000. .638. 11.495. .001. .176.
time.*.difficulty.*.TOIgroup. Sphericity.Assumed. .002. 2. .001. .038. .962. .001.
Greenhouse@Geisser. .002. 1.957. .001. .038. .960. .001.
Huynh@Feldt. .002. 2.000. .001. .038. .962. .001.
Lower@bound. .002. 1.000. .002. .038. .845. .001.
Error(time*difficulty). Sphericity.Assumed. 2.997. 108. .028.    
Greenhouse@Geisser. 2.997. 105.660. .028.    
Huynh@Feldt. 2.997. 108.000. .028.    
Lower@bound. 2.997. 54.000. .055.    
a..Computed.using.alpha.=..05.
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Paired  Samples  Statistics  
 Mean   N   Std.  Deviation   Std.  Error  Mean  
Pair  1   Cohens  w_DJOL_easy   .668670161685
919  
56  
.240952121436
570  
.032198581608
286  
Cohens  w_IJOL_easy   .271519389811
866  
56  
.193585964651
452  
.025869012664
781  
Pair  2   Cohens  
w_DJOL_moderate  
.674746471202
873  
56  
.223645965401
768  
.029885949230
990  
Cohens  
w_IJOL_moderate  
.381831641546
127  
56  
.191107599979
551  
.025537827254
719  
Pair  3   Cohens  
w_DJOL_difficult  
.482805987918
358  
56  
.260009694988
316  
.034745256995
924  
Cohens  
w_IJOL_Difficult  
.298827127565
724  
56  
.208241115141
132  
.027827389524
924  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
